The U.S. Coast Guard Needs Non-Military Icebreakers. That includes Aiviq.
It's like the last car in the rental lot. You may not want it, but you need it.
On December 20th, the U.S. Coast Guard accepted ownership of the icebreaker Aiviq. Despite the positive tone of the press release, the Aiviq is not a popular vessel.
Since 2016, I’ve spoken to many people involved in all aspects of icebreaking- Captains and crewmembers of icebreakers (both U.S. Coast Guard and commercial), naval architects, and shipbuilders. I cannot recall any truly positive comments concerning the Aiviq.
It isn’t hard to understand why the vessel has such a bad reputation. Built by Edison Chouest Offshore as an icebreaking AHTS (Anchor Handling Tug Supply), it was designed to support Royal Dutch Shell in drilling operations off the Alaskan coast.
Aiviq failed in that role. While towing the offshore drilling unit Kulluk near Alaska in December of 2012, Aiviq lost all power and was unable to prevent Kulluk from grounding in the Gulf of Alaska. Although the U.S. Coast Guard’s official investigation documents many problems with the operation, a main one was the Aiviq’s loss of power. The official report, although disputed by Aiviq’s crew, blames the loss of power on seawater-contaminated fuel— a condition caused by the poor design of Aiviq’s fuel storage and vent system1.
Despite this, I support the U.S. Coast Guard’s acquisition of Aiviq, to be renamed Storis. In my January 2nd U.S. Coast Guard Icebreaking Update, I commented about the U.S. Coast Guard’s acquisition of this vessel after a long period of resistance by writing:
It’s about time. Purchasing or leasing an existing commercial icebreaker for the U.S. Coast Guard in order to supplement the fleet is not a new idea, but one that the U.S. Coast Guard has resisted until very recently.
During my appearance on the Midrats podcast, I cited the U.S. Coast Guard’s earlier reluctance to accept the Aiviq an example of the U.S. Coast Guard’s refusal to accept a commonsense answer. A reader/listener commented on the podcast, noting
The only weak point was the attribution of the Coast Guard’s reluctance to accept Aiviq solely to institutional intransigence. The Coast Guard has some experience with Aiviq, having investigated its pivotal role in the grounding of the drill rig Kuluk in 2012.
I think Congress was right to push the U.S. Coast Guard toward Aiviq and other commercial solutions, and that it is right to continue to push the U.S. Coast Guard to explore new options in order to meet its mission requirements in the polar regions.
USCG: No Commercial Solutions Wanted
In a recent article for ProPublica, McKenzie Funk argues that the U.S. Coast Guard did not- and does not- want the Aiviq because of its poor record. Funk seems to attribute Aiviq’s eventual acquisition to corruption, as he often refers to donations made to specific members of Congress by employees of Edison Chouest, or donations by Chouest and its subsidiaries to other political funds. One such fund, the Congressman Don Young Legal Expense Trust, received $60,000 in donations from Chouest subsidiaries in 2011, resulting in an ethics investigation in which Young was cleared. The investigation also notes that Rep. Young was a close personal friend of Gary Chouest and other members of the Chouest family and had been for approximately ten years. Funk implies that it was these political donations that drove Young to push for the Aiviq, as observed in this exchange between Rep. Young and U.S. Coast Guard Admiral Charles Michel from July of 2016. From the ProPublica article:
The late U.S. Rep. Don Young represented Alaska, a state thousands of miles from Chouest’s home base in Louisiana. But as of 2016, when Chouest was looking to sell the Aiviq, Young had taken in hundreds of thousands of dollars in political contributions from the company — so many donations in one year that he had once faced a congressional ethics investigation concerning Chouest money. (He was cleared.)
Young became the most vocal of many congressional critics to publicly dress down the Coast Guard for resisting Chouest’s offering of the Aiviq.
At a House hearing that July, he began grilling the Coast Guard’s second-in-command, Adm. Charles Michel, about a “privately owned ship” with a “tremendous capability of icebreaking power.”
“I know you have the proposal on your desk,” he scolded Michel. “It is an automatic ‘no.’ Why?”
“Sir,” the admiral said, “that vessel is not suitable for military service without substantial refit.”
Michel’s response sparked derision from Young.
“That is what I call,” Young muttered, “a bullshit answer.”
Michel, now retired, declined to comment on his exchange with Young.
In preparation for this article, I went back and read the entire transcript from that 2016 hearing. It is clear from the transcript that the U.S. Coast Guard wasn’t just resistant to Aiviq- but to any commercial specification icebreaker out there, even just as an interim solution until the U.S. Coast Guard could build their own. Take this exchange (quoted at length) between Adm. Michel and Rep Hunter that immediately followed the one between Michel and Young:
Mr. HUNTER. All right. Let’s get into that, if you don’t mind, Admiral. Let’s go on the mil specs. So I am reading this. The Coast Guard polar icebreaking mission has four parts: breaking out McMurdo Station and providing some show of U.S. sovereign presence in the Southern Ocean. Does that require a military vessel or an icebreaker? I am just asking logically——
Admiral MICHEL. Sir, the Coast Guard only operates military vessels.
Mr. HUNTER. Does that require a military vessel to do that, what I just said?
Admiral MICHEL. Sir, the Coast Guard only operates military vessels.
Mr. HUNTER. Has—does a non-military vessel ever break out the McMurdo station?
Admiral MICHEL. Yes, it has.
Mr. HUNTER. OK. So I am going to ask it again. Does it take a military vessel to break out the McMurdo Station? That is a yes or no answer, Admiral. That is all you got to give me.
Admiral MICHEL. No, sir, but not in Coast Guard service.
Mr. HUNTER. OK. To provide an Arctic research platform, does that require a military vessel?
Admiral MICHEL. No, sir.
Mr. HUNTER. Meeting the Coast Guard maritime safety, search and rescue, fishery law enforcement, oil spill response in the Arctic, does that require a military vessel?
Admiral MICHEL. For the Coast Guard, yes, sir.
Mr. HUNTER. Does that require a military vessel, though?
Admiral MICHEL. It——
Mr. HUNTER. And when you——
Admiral MICHEL. I think you prefaced that with Coast Guard requirements. Yes, sir. We don’t operate non-military vessels, sir.
Mr. HUNTER. I didn’t ask if you would operate non-military vessels. I am asking you can a non-military vessel provide for search and rescue?
Admiral MICHEL. Yes, sir.
Mr. HUNTER. Fishery law enforcement, oil spill response?
Admiral MICHEL. Fishery law enforcement? No, sir. That re quires a law enforcement vessel of the United States, a——
Mr. HUNTER. A law enforcement vessel——
Admiral MICHEL [continuing]. Military vessel.
Mr. HUNTER. Then a military vessel.
Admiral MICHEL. Yes, sir. Law enforcement——
Mr. HUNTER. But you need——
Admiral MICHEL. The Coast Guard vessels are both military vessels and law enforcement——
Mr. HUNTER. I mean what do—do you need a CIWS on this, or— what—do you need to shoot rockets or missiles off its surface? What are we talking about when you say military vessel?
Admiral MICHEL. Sir, a military vessel of the United States is classified as a war ship under international law. It has certain privileges and immunities that go along with that. A military vessel of the United States is built to military specifications for military interoperability, for military survivability, for damage control——
Mr. HUNTER. Let me——
Admiral MICHEL [continuing]. For water-tight integrity——
Mr. HUNTER. But let me ask Mr.——
Admiral MICHEL [continuing]. For propulsion systems. And they are not built to commercial standards, sir.
Admiral Michel is resistant to the U.S. Coast Guard acquiring any icebreaker built to commercial standards- not just the Aiviq.
His argument is wrong. First, Article 29 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines a warship. It has nothing to do with the standard to which it is built2. And, under UNCLOS, warships and “other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes” have the same sovereign immunity. Articles 96 and 97 affirm this. So Aiviq- soon to be recommissioned Storis- will serve as a warship under international law.
As Admiral Michel noted, you do not need a warship to carry out the missions of U.S. Coast Guard icebreakers. And as I pointed out, you do not need a MIL-SPEC ship to be considered a warship (or law enforcement vessel) under international law.
There were other commercial icebreakers under consideration at the time to provide a short-term interim solution, including several proven polar icebreakers operated by Finland. As Mary McAuliffe reported recently in Arctic Today:
As early as 2013, Arctia, the state-run enterprise that operates Finland’s icebreaking fleet, began meeting with U.S. officials on Capitol Hill to discuss the possibility of leasing two of its premier icebreaking vessels during the off-season to help the U.S. meet its polar objectives.
It wasn’t just short-term leasing that was on the table. I was directly involved in an effort to acquire both short and interim solutions to the U.S. Coast Guard's icebreaker gap between 2018 and 2020. The short-term solution would have been the purchase or long-term demise lease of existing vessels. At the time, the Aiviq and two Finnish vessels were under consideration. The purchase or long-term lease of these vessels would have enabled them to be U.S. Coast Guard vessels carrying sovereign immunity- as we are seeing with the Aiviq today.
The mid-term solution called for building 3-4 commercial standard vessels in partnership with a Finnish shipyard. This plan, if adopted in 2020, could have produced two modern PC-2 commercial specification icebreakers for the U.S. Coast Guard by now. At a cost significantly less than the initial estimate ($1 Billion) for the first Polar Secuity Cutter.
The Risk to U.S. Coast Guard Missions..
But as Adm. Michel, stated, the U.S. Coast Guard only wants warships that break ice. This is ironic, considering that the missions of both the Polar Star and Healy are regularly accomplished by commercial specification vessels. Polar Star’s sole mission is to open a channel to McMurdo Station, and the Healy primarily supports National Science Foundation Research. When the Polar Star was unavailable, the National Science Foundation for several years chartered foreign commercial icebreakers to open a channel to McMurdo station. For a number of reasons, this option is no longer available3. The Healy conducts an Arctic science patrol once per year. As far as I can tell, Healy is the world’s only MIL-SPEC research icebreaker.
This is the effect on U.S. Coast Guard missions of having too few icebreakers:
As discussed above, these missions do not require a MIL-SPEC vessel. And only one, the McMurdo break-in, requires a ‘heavy’ icebreaking capability. Vessels such as the Aiviq are suited to conduct traditional U.S. Coast Guard missions in U.S. waters off of Alaska.
When it comes to the Polar Security Cutter, a comprehensive National Academies of Science study reached the following conclusion: (emphasis mine):
The committee believes that the adverse impacts on design, cost, and availability of reliable equipment outweigh any anticipated benefits that application of MIL-SPEC requirements to a new polar icebreaker might provide. The most cost-effective and reliable icebreaker for USCG is likely one that is designed and built to appropriate commercial and international standards for a polar icebreaker, similar to icebreakers in other nations around the world. (p. 74)
This Congressionally mandated study was conducted by a committee of experts who had been involved in both the design and construction of commercial and U.S. government vessels under MIL-SPEC and commercial standards. Note that this comparison is based on the ship’s hull and engineering components, not the communications systems and sensors (which will likely be MIL-SPEC).
I wrote an entire article on this topic. You can find it here.
As the chart above shows, by refusing to consider supplementing its fleet with icebreakers built to commercial specifications, the U.S. Coast Guard continues to accept a high level of risk to its Title 14 missions.
..as Opposed to the Risk to U.S. Coast Guard’s Desires
The ProPublica article notes the opposition of Admiral Paul Zukunft, a former Commandant of the Coast Guard who retired in 2018.
“I remain unconvinced,” he wrote in response to questions from ProPublica, that it “meets the operational requirements and design of a polar icebreaker that have been thoroughly documented by the Coast Guard.” By acquiring the Aiviq, “the Coast Guard runs the risk that those requirements can be compromised.”
I personally heard Adm. Zukunft make a similar statement regarding the Finnish icebreakers Nordica and Fennica:
These Finnish vessels are quite capable. But we (the U.S. Coast Guard) just can’t use them right now. If we present a lower cost option for icebreaking capabilities (such as leasing these vessels, or building ones like them) we risk losing our Heavy Icebreaker program. And we need to build those ships. We can’t risk that program. (Author’s recollection from a 2017 statement)
Of course, it is easier to say that when you are expecting to have three new ships by 2025. But China has built three polar-class vessels since I first heard Adm Zukunft make that statement, the U.S. none. The first of the Polar Security Cutters is now expected to be delivered by 2030 at the earliest. And although the U.S. Coast Guard hasn’t officially given a new cost update from its $1 billion cost, the current CBO estimate is about $1.9 billion for that first ship.
And the Coast Guard needs many more ships. This chart, from a 2024 Congressional Research Service report on Coast Guard acquisitions, shows a gap of 66 ships from what it plans to purchase (Program of Record) and what it needs to meet all of its statutory missions (Objective Fleet Mix Analysis):
With the money saved by purchasing/building modern icebreakers built to commercial and international standards, the U.S. Coast Guard can buy more of the ships that it desperately needs.
The Role of Congress
I believe that Congress was right to push the U.S. Coast Guard to consider commercial icebreakers such as Aiviq. But too often Congress is an impediment to progress. For although Reps Young and Hunter pushed the U.S. Coast Guard about its desire- as opposed to its need- to acquire MIL-SPEC icebreakers, Congress as a whole has been hostile (or at least perceived as hostile) to the acquisition of any foreign-built ships, including icebreakers. I have some anecdotal evidence that this is part of the reason the U.S. Coast Guard opposed acquiring vessels from Finland- that they did not want to end up advocating for something that could negatively affect their relationship with Congress4.
Certainly the U.S. Shipbuilding Lobby is strong and works hard to protect itself. However, there are no U.S. shipyards that specialize in building icebreakers. The most recent polar icebreakers built in the United States are the Aiviq (2012) and the Healy (1999). In between was the Great Lakes icebreaker Mackinaw (2006). Unlike Aiviq (and the Polar Security Cutter), Healy and Mackinaw were developed in cooperation with Finnish companies. As Finnish shipyards have a track record of turning out icebreakers in as little as 36 months, there really is nowhere else to go if the U.S. is serious about executing its Arctic Strategy in a timeframe that matters.
There are signs that the attitude in Congress is changing. Here is Rep. Garamendi in 2016:
I want to make one thing very clear with regard to where I would come from on the policy of American built or foreign built. No way, no how will this icebreaker—one, two, or more—be built in a foreign shipyard. It will be made in America, period.
And here is Rep. Garamendi in November 2024:
The question is can it be built in the United States in a timely manner. There's plenty of indication the answer is that we ain't doing very well now. So we're going to have to rethink this. We're going to have to rethink it. If you need 8-10 now, next year, year after next, the only way we're going to do it is to rethink how we're going to get those icebreakers. Made in America? No one's been stronger on that than I have over these years. But we're failing. Our industrial base has failed us.
There are other examples of other Members of Congress moving in this direction. (See here and here.) But every day of delay pushes the acquisition of the necessary capabilities into the future. Congress needs to do more, and to do it now.
Closing Thoughts/Analysis
Admiral Zukunft is right- if the U.S. Coast Guard took this route, it might never get its large icebreaking warships. The standard would be lowered forever. But the U.S. Coast Guard would be better able to afford the ships that it needs to conduct its required missions.
I repeatedly see Congress, frustrated by the PSC program delays and repeated excuses, pushing the U.S. Coast Guard in this direction. Building ships in Finland- something I have written about extensively- repeatedly comes up in recent Congressional Hearings. Congress needs to do more to support these solutions, as they are the only feasible way to acquire more icebreakers in the near and mid-terms.
In this case, the parochial interests of the U.S. Coast Guard do not line up with the interests of the United States. Congress needs to keep pushing them. The new Trump administration is already pressing the Coast Guard (as it did back in 2019-2020). More pressure will probably be coming soon.
So back to the Aiviq. It is true that no one likes it. But right now, it is the only ship available. Just because Chouest has been pushing the idea- and donating to Members of Congress- doesn’t mean that it’s a bad choice. And it is clearly a more urgent and less risky choice than it was in 2016. As McKenzie Funk notes in his ProPublica article, Aiviq’s fuel tank vents were moved, and the ship has had completed two successful icebreaking operations on behalf of the Australian government. And, of course, the Polar Security Cutter program is significantly over budget and well-behind schedule.
Yes, the Finns could still probably provide Nordica and/or Fennica and Otso. But such a deal will take time to negotiate. And the Finns may not want to make a deal, as they require all of their icebreakers to keep the designated ports open during the toughest ice conditions, which occur multiple times a decade. Giving up even one icebreaker before a new vessel is acquired introduces risk, although it may be possible if the sale or lease enables new vessel acquisition to move more quickly.
So we’re left with Aiviq- the last rental car in the lot. The abused compact car with a broken air conditioner, an AM radio, and an 8-track player. It is not a good option. But it has one important quality: it actually exists.
As always, there is much more to say on this topic. For example, one of the U.S. Coast Guard’s missions is to ensure DoD access to the Arctic and Antarctic. I’m not convinced that our current icebreakers can cut a path for U.S. Navy vessels. If we want the Navy to access polar waters, perhaps it is time to revisit U.S. Government policy and build some ice-capable warships (not necessarily icebreakers).
Coming next, more on Davie’s vision for a Transatlantic partnership on icebreaking, including an update on their planned investment in the United States.
All the Best,
PGR
Although the report ultimately blames the grounding on a failure to properly assess risks during the planning phase, it notes significant problems with Aiviq in addition to design including crew performance, procedures related to the fuel system, and a failure to properly report material problems to the U.S. Coast Guard.
For the purposes of this Convention, "warship" means a ship belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing the external marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government of the State and whose name appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned by a crew which is under regular armed forces discipline. (UNCLOS Article 29).
Chartered vessels included Russian icebreakers that are no longer available and Sweden’s Oden, which is now required to be in Swedish waters during the annual window for McMurdo’s breakout.
An example is the U.S. Coast Guard’s past reliance on Congress to fund its “Unfunded Priorities List” which contains items that the USCG needs but were not requested in the Executive Branch’s own budget submission. While worth discussing, this is beyond the scope of this particular article. For more, see this June 2024 Statement from Ms. Shelby Oakley of the GAO: COAST GUARD ACQUISITION: Actions Needed to Address Affordability Challenges.
Rep. Garamendi in November 2024 "Our industrial base has failed us." If he had ever sat in a USCG/shipyard meeting, his quote would have been "our insanely bloated federal bureaucracy has failed us miserably." Be careful what you wish for, Finland. You have no idea...
I think come back after DOGE doc drop. Heads gonna roll.