Bipartisan Congressional Support Builds to 'Rethink' Icebreaker Acquisition
Positive indications from a recent House Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee hearing
The House Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation held a hearing on November 14th amusingly titled “Snowed In: United States Disinvestment in the Arctic.”
I’ve been watching hearings about the U.S. Coast Guard’s icebreakers- held normally by both the T&I Committee and Homeland Security Committee- for some time. They follow a pattern of sorts. The U.S. Coast Guard leadership states that it is carrying out the nation’s business, somehow managing to get the job done with insufficient resources. The leadership then provides the latest “official” status of its programs- a report that normally bears no resemblance to reality1. Members of Congress will then ask some tough questions which the U.S. Coast Guard leadership will deflect, and there will be little follow-up.
The same problems normally surface. For example, the U.S. Coast Guard says it needs 8-9 icebreakers but has no long-term shipbuilding plan. The Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program aims to build three of these nine, but it is well over budget and years behind schedule. Congress will chastise the Coast Guard for failing to ask for everything that it needs, and for resisting outside efforts to assist it. There will be lots of blame, but none of it involves serious introspection about how the U.S. Coast Guard could have done things differently. Repeat again in a few months.
I try to highlight a few things that are different from hearing to hearing, finding some elements within each to classify as the good, the bad, and the ugly. We’ll start with the good news (at least good for those of us who want the U.S. Coast Guard to get the ships that it needs within a relevant timeframe):
The Good: Bipartisan Support for ‘Rethinking’ Icebreaker Acquisition
This starts with John Garamendi (D-CA) in his questions for Vice Admiral (VADM) Peter Gautier, the U.S. Coast Guard Deputy Commandant for Operations.
Mr. Garamendi is a strong advocate for strengthening the U.S. Maritime sector. He is one of four authors of the bipartisan Congressional Guidance for a National Maritime Strategy, along with Congressman Mile Waltz, Senator Marco Rubio, and Senator Mark Kelly. Mr. Garamendi has appeared with Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro, supporting SECNAV’s efforts at Maritime Statecraft.
Mr. Garamendi is a strong supporter of the Jones Act and of building ships in the USA- so much so that he received the 2021 Maritime Leadership Award from the Shipbuilders Council of America. I’ve heard that when discussing icebreaker construction in the past, he has been adamant that they must be built in the USA. Because of this, I found the following exchange notable:
Mr. Garamendi: What I'm trying to do is to put on the record here that we’ve got one very serious national security problem. Don't dance around. The fact of the matter is that we do not have a presence in the Arctic. We know where the Polar Star is2. Eventually you're not going to be able to cannibalize other icebreakers to maintain the Polar Star3. The bottom line here is there is a national security threat of great significance as a result of the inability of the Coast Guard to have adequate presence in the Arctic. Do you agree or disagree with me?
VADM Gautier: I agree
Mr. Garamendi: Very good. Now what does it take, 8-10 icebreakers of which three are heavy icebreakers, which will probably be able to be delivered sometime around 2040. Is that correct?
VADM Gautier: It's going to take a long time to produce…
Mr. Garamendi: A longtime, a decade. Minimum of a decade for the first one. And then who knows the next two and third one. Bottom line here and this is really for us. We have continually underfunded the Coast Guard icebreaker program. Continually. And unfortunately, the Coast Guard has not sounded the red alarm and laid down “give us the money or we cannot do it.” So we’re going to have to come forward here with the money necessary to do it. The question is can it be built in the United States in a timely manner. There's plenty of indication the answer is that we ain't doing very well now. So we're going to have to rethink this. We're going to have to rethink it. If you need 8-10 now, next year, year after next, the only way we're going to do it is to rethink how we're going to get those icebreakers. Made in America? No one's been stronger on that than I have over these years. But we're failing. Our industrial base has failed us. And frankly the Coast Guard has failed us by not sounding an alarm loud.
Other Committee members— from both sides of the aisle— made similar comments or directly associated themselves with Mr. Garamendi’s remarks.
The Bad
Cost and Schedule:
The U.S. Coast Guard reported earlier in 2024 that the PSC program “would exceed cost and schedule thresholds.” The USCG owes an update to Congress by the end of this year, but the official update was not available at the time of this hearing. Still, there are hints.
Cost!
In response to a question from Jeff Van Drew (R-NJ), VADM Thomas Allan, the U.S. Coas Guard Deputy Commandant for Mission Support, said:
Sir, we do not have enough (money) to complete the number one. The question is how much more do we need and we think by December we will understand final contract negotiations. What that dollar amount is and what gap exists.
Congress has already appropriated more than $1.7 billion for the PSC program- but this was for the construction of two vessels4! I don’t know if the appropriations can be shifted- some of the appropriated funds surely went for long-lead items for the second and third vessels. Still, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that the cost of the first vessel will be at least $1.9 billion, with subsequent vessels costing $1.6 billion or more. And that’s just the construction cost- the CBO also believes that the USCG is vastly underestimating the cost to operate the vessels.
$1.7 billion USD is more than 5X THE COST of the PC2 icebreaker Le Commandant Charcot (2017 dollars). Charcot is an icebreaker of comparable size and capability to the PSC’s design. Don’t let its appearance fool you- Charcot, sometimes described as “NATO’s most capable icebreaker,” is an icebreaker first, a luxury cruise ship second. You can read more about Charcot here, including a direct comparison with the proposed PSC:
Schedule:
There is still no information on the planned schedule for construction of the PSCs. Even if there were, I doubt anyone would have any confidence in tit. Sometime in the 2030s for the first ship, 2040 before all three would be available: these dates were used- and not challenged- during the hearing.
The Coast Guard still seems adamant that it will do something in calendar 2024. But what? Back in July, the Commandant of the Coast Guard told the Homeland Security Committee:
Admiral Fagan: I’m confident in the shipbuilder that we have, I’m confident in where we are in regard to design maturity and I’m confident that we will begin building that ship before the end of the year.
In this hearing:
VADM Allan: I’m pleased to report that we are on track to seek approval from the Department to begin production by end of this calendar year.
So, will construction actually begin, or will the USCG merely be seeking approval to begin construction by December 31st? This is political nonsense. Starting production without a completed design is a bad idea, but one the USCG seems to be pushing for in order to “do something!”
Giving conflicting testimony doesn’t help, either. VADM Allan gave two different timelines for taking the Aiviq into Coast Guard inventory. At one point, he said by the end of this fiscal year. At another, he said by the end of this calendar year.
The Ugly: Zero Accountability
I’m used to all of the positive spin, to the point where I don’t bother quoting it much anymore. But this time, there was one statement- from the GAO rep! - that caught my attention:
Mr. Larsen: How has the Coast Guard and the Navy partnership worked? The whole idea of having the Navy be part of this was to bring the Navy’s experience into the design development but it doesn’t seem to have worked as planned.
Ms. MacLeod: GAO has reported you know the partnership between the Navy and the Coast Guard has worked well for this procurement, these procurements. I think that there’s been a range of reasons for the delays from contractor to Coast Guard acquisition inexperience, but the partnership itself seems to be working well and has benefited the Coast Guard.
UNBELIEVABLE. The GAO generally gets things right, but I can’t understand this answer.
What is the metric here, if not the ability to actually procure an icebreaker? I’m sure the crew on the Titanic got along well, too. But what about results? Who will be held accountable for these programs?
It’s always “someone else’s fault” or the fault of some force beyond our control (COVID, lack of qualified workers, VT Halter, etc.). Yet someone made the decision to award the contract to VT Halter. Other shipyards churn out ships despite COVID, and Bollinger is not the only yard to face a worker shortage. Surely some of these problems could have been foreseen.
I remain especially critical of the original decision- to award the contract to a shipyard/designer combination with no experience in designing and building icebreakers.
It frustrates me that we seem to be learning nothing at all from this mess. And if you pay taxes to the U.S. Government, it should frustrate you too.
Other: The ICE Pact and Seattle
Even if, magically, three Polar Security Cutters fell from the sky, their designated home port (Seattle) would not be ready to receive them. According to VADM Allan, the USCG is currently working on the environmental impact statement for the required improvements to its Seattle base necessary to place three Polar Security Cutters there. At least $280 million is going to support those improvements in FY 24 and FY 25.
The ICE Pact was mentioned once with no real details provided. The U.S. Coast Guard will be participating in ICE Pact working groups, but there are as of yet no concrete details or proposals of what type of support the ICE Pact can provide. I will be writing more about the ICE Pact separately.
Concluding Thoughts:
The more I watch Congressional Hearings like this one, the more I come to believe that no one really has confidence in the Polar Security Cutter program. It is clear that the Members and Staffs of both the Transportation and Infrastructure and the Homeland Security Committees are working hard to try and help the U.S. Coast Guard to get the ships that they need. The questions are becoming more pointed, and I hope that behind the scenes they are working together with their colleagues on the Appropriation Committee and in the Senate.
For the U.S. Coast Guard- Frankly, I expect more from the uniformed leadership.
While VADM Allan is new in his position, he does have experience as the Assistant Commandant for Resources and CFO from 2018-2020 (when the PSC contract was awarded) and as the Chief of Congressional and Governmental Affairs (from 2015-2017). He should be able to provide some insight into the decisions that got the USCG to this point.
The U.S. Coast Guard still cannot articulate a plan to reach the 8-9 icebreakers that it says it needs. The Committee continues to ask for this, and the GAO has for years been saying that the U.S. Coast Guard needs a long-term (twenty year) shipbuilding plan. Congress mandated one in 2016. As of today, the U.S. Coast Guard has not submitted such a plan to Congress. That’s eight years later. UNBELIEVABLE.
In the absence of a plan, Congress has made some suggestions- including leasing or purchasing an existing icebreaker. The U.S. Coast Guard resisted this until very recently. Had they considered the idea seriously earlier, perhaps there would be two formerly commercial icebreakers5 currently in U.S. Coast Guard inventory.
Perhaps the Coast Guard should listen to the Committee, the GAO, and many others and put forward a plan to acquire what it needs, rather than playing political and budgetary games.
The good news here is that Congress seems willing to rethink icebreaker acquisition, with Mr. Garamendi leading the way. As I wrote recently, the incoming Trump administration will likely be amenable to a solution that involves building one or more icebreakers in an allied nation in partnership with a U.S. shipbuilder. After gaining experience and know-how, the U.S. shipbuilder would then build subsequent vessels in the USA, with the assistance (as required) of our ally. This seems like the best way to acquire icebreakers and build up U.S. shipbuilding expertise in a relevant timeline.
But this remains difficult politically. I will keep you up to date on how things are proceeding on both sides of the Atlantic.
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I’ve held off on an ICE Pact update, as I heard that the Department of Homeland Security will soon release the recently signed Memorandum of Understanding. I won’t wait forever, though- you can expect an update soon.
Happy Thanksgiving!
Until next time.
All the Best,
PGR
For reference, I can point to April 2023 testimony by the Commandant of the Coast Guard that the Polar Security Cutter was “on budget and on contract.” Later, in response to tough questions, she declined to say in which decade the first Polar Security Cutter (PSC) might be delivered.
Polar Star takes part in one mission per year, Operation Deep Freeze, in which is breaks open a channel to McMurdo station in Antarctica, enabling resupply of the National Science Foundation’s research facilities in Antarctica. Following this mission, it enters drydock for repairs. Note that due to COVID, there was no Operation Deep Freeze in 2020-21, allowing Polar Star to make a rare Arctic patrol.
Polar Sea, Polar Star’s sister ship, has been out of service since 2010 due to significant engine failure. Polar Sea serves now as a source of rare replacement parts for the Polar Star, but this is not sustainable.
Including all government and shipyard costs, the 2021 estimate for two vessels was $1.832 billion ($1.038 billion for the first and $794 million for the second).
The Aiviq and one vessel from Finland, either the Nordica or Fennica.
It pains me to write this...
US shipbuilding is NASA. Mostly a jobs program.
Shipbuilders in Japan, Korea, and (to a lesser estent) the Eurozone are SpaceX. They are forged from competition.
Everyone with technical and math sense knows SpaceX is ~10x cheaper than NASA per Kg of mass to low earth orbit.
Foreign shipbuilders are 2-3x more efficient than US yards. And these nations are our ALLIES.
Fer cryin out load, requisition an allied Icebreaker (or two). And maybe an allied Frigate or Destroyer every year.
I honestly think these Jones Act and Buy 'Merica! cement heads would rather lose a war with China than properly build out sufficient naval capability. They are not patriots, they are grifters.