Some very excellent analysis in this podcast. The only weak point was the attribution of the Coast Guard’s reluctance to accept Aiviq solely to institutional intransigence. The Coast Guard has some experience with Aiviq, having investigated its pivotal role in the grounding of the drill rig Kuluk in 2012. That accident resulted directly in Shell’s termination of Arctic work offshore Alaska and consequently, delegation of Aiviq to the status of ship without a contract and the motivation of its owners to unload it. That has now occurred, at the tail end of some very significant and targeted political contributions. I went to sea commercially under the US flag for over 40 years, 31 of that in command, some of that in the ice. The Master of the Aiviq at the time of the Kuluk tow was a colleague of mine. Since he’d been placed in command of the vessel he’d reported the unsuitability of the ship for the high latitude conditions it was built for and offered mitigations. The deficiencies included trim and stability issues, the fuel system, and retention of hundreds of tons of seawater on the aft deck during even moderately heavy weather. The Coast Guard knows this as well. Over the course of my career I was a plank owner on several vessels and spent most of my time on ships younger than 10 years of age. At least part of the problem with shipbuilding in the US is that the modern design process seems to take into consideration customer requirements for overall capabilities, capacities, and work space desires first, then fit that into an often high-windage, ungainly and slab-sides platform that will meet regulatory requirements. Those regulatory requirements generally preclude structural failure if scantlings and loading guidance are maintained and certainly address intact and damage stability. What they don’t do in a systematic way is address the sea-kindliness of the ship, or even it’s real seaworthiness. There’s more to it than adequate metacentric height. Aiviq suffered from this as much or more than most of her contemporaries coming out of commercial yards. An anecdote may illustrate the broad problem more succinctly: I once took delivery of a new vessel and, standing at the aft control station with the shipyard representative, asked why there were no wipers on the windows directly in front of the controls. I was told the inboard angle would keep the rain off, and spray would never get that high.
Norman, thanks for the thoughtful reply and the information. I am and was aware of some of Aiviq's problems working with Shell, particularly the seawater intrusion into the fuel tanks (or so it was told to me) that resulted in the complete shutdown during that towing operation. I've heard or read (although I cannot remember where) that the system was modified after the event to prevent a recurrence. After reading your note, I pulled up the USCG Investigation into the Kuluk from the end of 2012. There's a lot to see there, and I'm sure it made many in the USCG skeptical.
Despite some positive reports regarding Aiviq's performance supporting Australia's Antarctic work, many of those I know in icebreaker design and operations are curious to see how the USCG evaluates Aiviq's performance. I could have emphasized this a bit more, but hey, you always miss something in live discussions.
Truly, though, I didn't hear anything about that from leadership. There is a recurring refusal of USCG leadership to really learn about icebreaking, or to look for solutions beyond their super expensive vessel. Congressional testimony shows this over and over again.
It's clear that acquiring Aiviq won't solve everything, but it should be better than sending California and Hawaii based National Security Cutters to conduct Arctic patrols in January.
As for my experience USCG leadership:
I didn't begin closely following icebreakers until 2017. My first experiences were not with those with icebreaker or Alaska experience, but rather with those at the SES/flag level. And I can say that those I met did not know much about icebreaking. Most assumed at the time that VT Halter could easily build the vessels that they wanted (one quote "we're not talking nuclear submarines here") and there was a refusal to consider any other options for a short to mid-term fill. Not just the Aiviq, but anything (including lease/purchase of Nordica or Fenica, or construction of a commercial spec icebreaker). They were stuck on measuring icebreaking ability by BHP as well and were generally unfamiliar with commercial and modern designs, especially those built and operated in Europe (where I was stationed).
When I finally did meet folks with USCG icebreaking experience, they told me that the Polar Security Cutter program was intensely political, and as a result the USCG would accept nothing that would potentially slow down its construction. In was only in late 2020, under intense pressure from the White House, that the Coast Guard began formally assessing all potentially available icebreakers (that included the Aiviq).
At this point, USCG leadership was intransigent. Although forced to look at other solutions, they were intent on slow rolling it until the new administration took over. And when it did, the push for short- and medium-term solutions for USCG icebreaking vanished overnight.
The political unwillingness went even further. I was told by someone in a position to know that PSC hull 1 originally had no bow thruster. At the time, rather than modifying the design, they planned to build the ship 'as is' and then fix it for the second hull. This meant that hull one would not be able to moor at McMurdo. But the leadership didn't care- they wanted it bad- and they got it bad. I can only assume that in the years of delay since that bow thrusters were added into the design.
Some very excellent analysis in this podcast. The only weak point was the attribution of the Coast Guard’s reluctance to accept Aiviq solely to institutional intransigence. The Coast Guard has some experience with Aiviq, having investigated its pivotal role in the grounding of the drill rig Kuluk in 2012. That accident resulted directly in Shell’s termination of Arctic work offshore Alaska and consequently, delegation of Aiviq to the status of ship without a contract and the motivation of its owners to unload it. That has now occurred, at the tail end of some very significant and targeted political contributions. I went to sea commercially under the US flag for over 40 years, 31 of that in command, some of that in the ice. The Master of the Aiviq at the time of the Kuluk tow was a colleague of mine. Since he’d been placed in command of the vessel he’d reported the unsuitability of the ship for the high latitude conditions it was built for and offered mitigations. The deficiencies included trim and stability issues, the fuel system, and retention of hundreds of tons of seawater on the aft deck during even moderately heavy weather. The Coast Guard knows this as well. Over the course of my career I was a plank owner on several vessels and spent most of my time on ships younger than 10 years of age. At least part of the problem with shipbuilding in the US is that the modern design process seems to take into consideration customer requirements for overall capabilities, capacities, and work space desires first, then fit that into an often high-windage, ungainly and slab-sides platform that will meet regulatory requirements. Those regulatory requirements generally preclude structural failure if scantlings and loading guidance are maintained and certainly address intact and damage stability. What they don’t do in a systematic way is address the sea-kindliness of the ship, or even it’s real seaworthiness. There’s more to it than adequate metacentric height. Aiviq suffered from this as much or more than most of her contemporaries coming out of commercial yards. An anecdote may illustrate the broad problem more succinctly: I once took delivery of a new vessel and, standing at the aft control station with the shipyard representative, asked why there were no wipers on the windows directly in front of the controls. I was told the inboard angle would keep the rain off, and spray would never get that high.
Norman, thanks for the thoughtful reply and the information. I am and was aware of some of Aiviq's problems working with Shell, particularly the seawater intrusion into the fuel tanks (or so it was told to me) that resulted in the complete shutdown during that towing operation. I've heard or read (although I cannot remember where) that the system was modified after the event to prevent a recurrence. After reading your note, I pulled up the USCG Investigation into the Kuluk from the end of 2012. There's a lot to see there, and I'm sure it made many in the USCG skeptical.
Despite some positive reports regarding Aiviq's performance supporting Australia's Antarctic work, many of those I know in icebreaker design and operations are curious to see how the USCG evaluates Aiviq's performance. I could have emphasized this a bit more, but hey, you always miss something in live discussions.
Truly, though, I didn't hear anything about that from leadership. There is a recurring refusal of USCG leadership to really learn about icebreaking, or to look for solutions beyond their super expensive vessel. Congressional testimony shows this over and over again.
It's clear that acquiring Aiviq won't solve everything, but it should be better than sending California and Hawaii based National Security Cutters to conduct Arctic patrols in January.
As for my experience USCG leadership:
I didn't begin closely following icebreakers until 2017. My first experiences were not with those with icebreaker or Alaska experience, but rather with those at the SES/flag level. And I can say that those I met did not know much about icebreaking. Most assumed at the time that VT Halter could easily build the vessels that they wanted (one quote "we're not talking nuclear submarines here") and there was a refusal to consider any other options for a short to mid-term fill. Not just the Aiviq, but anything (including lease/purchase of Nordica or Fenica, or construction of a commercial spec icebreaker). They were stuck on measuring icebreaking ability by BHP as well and were generally unfamiliar with commercial and modern designs, especially those built and operated in Europe (where I was stationed).
When I finally did meet folks with USCG icebreaking experience, they told me that the Polar Security Cutter program was intensely political, and as a result the USCG would accept nothing that would potentially slow down its construction. In was only in late 2020, under intense pressure from the White House, that the Coast Guard began formally assessing all potentially available icebreakers (that included the Aiviq).
At this point, USCG leadership was intransigent. Although forced to look at other solutions, they were intent on slow rolling it until the new administration took over. And when it did, the push for short- and medium-term solutions for USCG icebreaking vanished overnight.
The political unwillingness went even further. I was told by someone in a position to know that PSC hull 1 originally had no bow thruster. At the time, rather than modifying the design, they planned to build the ship 'as is' and then fix it for the second hull. This meant that hull one would not be able to moor at McMurdo. But the leadership didn't care- they wanted it bad- and they got it bad. I can only assume that in the years of delay since that bow thrusters were added into the design.
All the best,
PGR